Abstract While automated verification of imperative programs has been studied intensively, proving termination of programs with explicit pointer arithmetic fully automatically was still an open problem. To close this gap, we introduce a novel abstract domain that can track allocated memory in detail. We use it to automatically construct a symbolic execution graph that over-approximates all possible runs of a program and that can be used to prove memory safety. This graph is then transformed into an integer transition system, whose termination can be proved by standard techniques. We implemented this approach in the automated termination prover AProVE and demonstrate its capability of analyzing C programs with pointer arithmetic that existing tools cannot handle.
Introduction
Consider the following standard C implementation of strlen [62, 72] , computing the length of the string at the pointer str. In C, strings are usually represented as a pointer str to the heap, where all following memory cells up to the first one that contains the value 0 are allocated memory and form the value of the string.
int strlen(char* str) {char* s = str; while(*s) s++; return s-str;} To analyze algorithms on such data, one has to handle the interplay between addresses and the values they point to. In C, a violation of memory safety (e.g., de-referencing NULL, accessing an array outside its bounds, etc.) leads to undefined behavior, which may also include non-termination. Thus, to prove termination of C programs with low-level memory access, one must also ensure memory safety. The strlen algorithm is memory safe and terminates, because there is some address end ≥ str (an integer property of end and str) such that *end is 0 (a pointer property of end) and all addresses str ≤ s ≤ end are allocated. Other typical programs with pointer arithmetic operate on arrays (which are just sequences of memory cells in C). In this paper, we present a novel approach to prove memory safety and termination of algorithms on integers and pointers automatically. Our abstract domain is tailored to track both integer properties which relate allocated memory addresses with each other, as well as pointer properties about the data stored at such addresses.
To avoid handling the intricacies of C, we analyze programs in the platform-independent intermediate representation (IR) of the LLVM compilation framework [51, 53] . Our approach works in three steps: First, a symbolic execution graph is created that represents an over-approximation of all possible program runs. We present our abstract domain based on separation logic [61] in Sect. 2 and the automated generation of such graphs in Sect. 3 . In Sect. 4 we show the correctness of our construction. In this first step from LLVM to the symbolic execution graph, we handle all issues related to memory, and in particular we prove memory safety of our input program. In Sect. 5, we describe the second step of our approach, in which we generate an integer transition system (ITS) from the symbolic execution graph, encoding the essential information needed to show termination. In the last step, existing techniques for integer programs are used to prove termination of the resulting ITS. In Sect. 6, we compare our approach with related work and show that our implementation in the termination prover AProVE proves memory safety and termination of typical pointer algorithms that could not be handled by other tools before.
A preliminary version of parts of this paper was published in [67] . The present paper extends [67] by the following new contributions:
-We lift the restriction of analyzing only programs with exactly one function to nonrecursive programs with several functions. -We show how to consider alignment information in the abstract domain. In [67] , we just assumed a 1 byte data alignment for all types. -In [67] , we only handled memory allocation using the LLVM instruction alloca. In this paper, we extend our abstract domain and our symbolic execution rules to handle the external functions malloc and free. This allows us to model memory safety more precisely. Up to now, we could only prove absence of accesses to unallocated memory, whereas now, we can also show that free is only called for addresses that have been returned by malloc and that have not been released already. Note that if memory is not released by the end of the program, then we do not consider this as a violation of memory safety, because it does not lead to undefined behavior. -We added more symbolic execution rules for LLVM instructions, and give a detailed overview of our limitations in Sect. 6. -To represent all possible program runs by a finite symbolic execution graph, it is crucial to merge abstract program states that visit the same program position. We have substan-tially improved the merging heuristic of [67] in order to also analyze programs where termination or memory safety depend on invariants relating different areas of allocated memory. Such reasoning is required for programs like the strcpy function from the standard C library. Our symbolic execution can now handle such programs automatically, whereas [67] fails to prove memory safety (and hence also termination). -We prove the soundness of our approach w.r.t. the formal LLVM semantics from [73] , and provide all proofs in the paper.
Abstract Domain for Symbolic Execution
In this section, we introduce concrete LLVM states and abstract states that represent sets of concrete states. These states will be needed for symbolic execution in Sect. 3.
To simplify the presentation, we restrict ourselves to types of the form in (for n-bit integers), in* (for pointers to values of type in), in**, in***, etc. Like many other approaches to termination analysis, we disregard integer overflows and assume that variables are only instantiated with signed integers appropriate for their type.
define i32 @strlen(i8* str) { entry: 0: c0 = load i8* str 1: c0zero = icmp eq i8 c0, 0 2: br i1 c0zero, label done, label loop loop: 0: olds = phi i8* [str,entry], [s,loop] 1: s = getelementptr i8* olds, i32 1 2: c = load i8* s 3: czero = icmp eq i8 c, 0 4: br i1 czero, label done, label loop done: 0: sfin = phi i8* [str,entry], [s,loop] 1: sfinint = ptrtoint i8* sfin to i32 2: strint = ptrtoint i8* str to i32 3: size = sub i32 sfinint, strint 4: ret i32 size }
We consider the strlen function from Sect. 1. In the corresponding LLVM code, 1 str has the type i8*, since it is a pointer to the string's first character (of type i8). The program is split into the basic blocks entry, loop, and done. We will explain this LLVM code in detail when constructing the symbolic execution graph in Sect. 3 .
An LLVM state consists of a call stack, a knowledge base with information about the values of symbolic variables, and two sets which describe memory allocations and the contents of memory. The call stack is a sequence of stack frames, where each stack frame contains information local to its corresponding function. In particular, a stack frame contains the current program position which is represented by a pair (b, j). Here, b is the name of the current basic block and j is the index of the next instruction. So if Blks is the set of all basic blocks, then the set of program positions is Pos = Blks × N. To ease the formalization, we assume that different functions do not have basic blocks with the same names. Moreover, a stack frame also contains information on the current values of the local program variables. We represent an assignment to the local variables V P (e.g., V P = {str, c0, . . .}) in the i-th stack frame as a partial function LV i : V P V sym (where " " denotes partial functions).
We use an infinite set of symbolic variables V sym with V sym ∩ V P = {} instead of concrete integers. Many of the rules for symbolic execution in Sect. 3 have conditions where one has to check validity of formulas obtained from the knowledge base of the current state. In principle, any SMT solver can be used for this check. Most of these formulas only use linear integer arithmetic, but for programs with non-linear expressions (like x * y), the resulting formulas can also contain non-linear arithmetic. As validity is not decidable for non-linear integer arithmetic, the power of the SMT solver influences the power of our analysis, since symbolic execution rules can only be applied if the proof for their applicability conditions succeeds.
The third component is the global allocation list AL. It is used to model memory allocated by malloc, where allocated parts of the memory are again represented by expressions of the form v 1 , v 2 . In contrast to alloca, memory allocated by malloc needs to be released explicitly by the programmer. In this paper, we assume that reading from memory locations that are currently allocated but not initialized, yields an arbitrary fixed value. To remove this assumption, a structure similar to AL could be used to track initialized memory regions.
As the fourth and final component, PT is a set of "points-to" atoms v 1 → ty v 2 where v 1 , v 2 ∈ V sym and ty is an LLVM type. This means that the value v 2 of type ty is stored at the address v 1 . Let size(ty) be the number of bytes required for values of type ty (e.g., size(i8) = 1 and size(i32) = 4). As each memory cell stores one byte, v 1 → i32 v 2 means that v 2 is stored in the four cells at the addresses v 1 , . . . , v 1 + 3. The size of a pointer type ty* is determined by the data layout string in the beginning of an LLVM program. On 64-bit machine architectures, we usually have size(ty*) = 8, and on 32-bit architectures we usually have size(ty*) = 4. In the following let us consider some fixed value for size(ty*).
Finally, to model possible violations of memory safety, we introduce a special error state ERR. In particular, this state is reached when accessing non-allocated memory. The following definition introduces our notion of (possibly abstract) LLVM states formally. 
Definition 1 (LLVM States) LLVM states have the form (CS, KB, AL, PT ) where CS
is defined} and extend LV i to a function from V P Z to V sym Z by defining LV i (n) = n for all n ∈ Z. We also often identify CS with the set of equations 1≤i≤n
} be the set of all these indexed variables that we use to represent stack frames. Moreover, we write AL * for the union of the global allocation list with the allocation lists in the individual stack frames, i.e., AL * = AL ∪ AL 1 ∪ . . . ∪ AL n . Thus, AL * represents all currently allocated memory (by alloca or malloc) in the current state. We say that a state (CS, KB, AL, PT ) is well formed iff for every "points-to" information v → ty w ∈ PT , there is an allocated area
So PT only contains information about addresses that are known to be allocated.
As an example, consider the following abstract state for our strlen program:
It represents states at the beginning of the entry block, where CS = [((entry, 0), LV 1 , {})] with LV 1 (str) = u str and no memory was allocated by alloca. Due to an earlier call of malloc, the memory cells between LV 1 (str) = u str and v end are allocated on the heap, and the value at the address v end is z (where the knowledge base is {z = 0}).
To define the semantics of abstract states a, we introduce the formulas a SL and a FO . Here, a SL is a formula from a fragment of separation logic [61] that defines which concrete states are represented by a. The first-order formula a FO is a weakened version of a SL , used for the automation of our approach. We use it to construct symbolic execution graphs, as it allows us to apply standard SMT solving [59] for all reasoning. We also use a FO for the subsequent generation of integer transition systems from symbolic execution graphs.
The formula a FO contains KB, and in addition, it expresses that the pairs v 1 , v 2 in allocation lists represent disjoint intervals. Moreover, two values at the same address must be equal and two addresses must be different if they point to different values in PT . Finally, all addresses are positive numbers.
Definition 2 (Representing States by FO Formulas)
The set a FO is the smallest set with 
Moreover, ERR is also a concrete state.
A state a = ERR always stands for a memory-safe state where exactly the addresses in AL * are allocated. Let → LLVM be LLVM's evaluation relation on concrete states, i.e., c → LLVM c holds iff c evaluates to c by executing one LLVM instruction. Similarly, c → LLVM ERR means that the evaluation step performs an operation that may lead to undefined behavior. An LLVM program is memory safe for c = ERR iff there is no evaluation c → + LLVM ERR, where → + LLVM is the transitive closure of → LLVM .
As mentioned, in addition to a FO , we also introduce a separation logic formula a SL for every state a. We consider a fragment of separation logic which extends first-order logic by a predicate symbol " →" for "points-to" information and by the connective " * " for separating conjunction. As usual, ϕ 1 * ϕ 2 means that ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 hold for disjoint parts of the memory. The semantics of separation logic can then be defined using interpretations of the form (as, mem) which represent the values of the program variables and the heap. The (partial) assignment function as : V fr P Z is used to describe the values of the program variables (more precisely, as operates on variables of the form x i to represent the variable x ∈ V P occurring in the i-th stack frame). Moreover, a partial function mem : N >0 {0, . . . , 2 8 − 1} with finite domain describes the memory contents at allocated addresses (as unsigned bytes).
To deal with symbolic variables in formulas, we use instantiations. Let T (V sym ) be the set of all arithmetic terms containing only variables from V sym . Any function σ : 
, and let ϕ be a formula such that as is defined on all variables from V fr P that occur in ϕ. Let as(ϕ) result from replacing all x i in ϕ by as(x i ). Note that by construction, local variables x i are never quantified in our formulas. Then we define (as, mem) | ϕ iff mem | as(ϕ).
We now define mem | ψ for formulas ψ that may contain symbolic variables from V sym (this is needed for Sect. 3). As usual, all free variables v 1 , . . . , v n in ψ are implicitly universally quantified, i.e., mem | ψ iff mem | ∀v 1 , . . . , v n . ψ. The semantics of arithmetic operations and predicates as well as of first-order connectives and quantifiers are as usual. In particular, we define mem | ∀v. ψ iff mem | σ (ψ) holds for all instantiations σ where σ (v) ∈ Z and σ (w) = w for all w ∈ V sym \ {v}.
We still have to define the semantics of → and * for variable-free formulas. For n 1 , n 2 ∈ Z, let mem | n 1 → n 2 hold iff mem(n 1 ) = n 2 . 2 The semantics of * is defined as usual in separation logic: For two partial functions mem 1 To formalize the semantics of an abstract state a, i.e., to define which concrete states are represented by a, we now define a SL . In a SL , we combine the elements of AL * with the separating conjunction " * " to express that different allocated memory blocks are disjoint. We have to include an additional separated conjunct true to represent further allocations that we do not know of. In contrast, the elements of PT are combined by the ordinary conjunction "∧". So (v 1 → ty v 2 ) ∈ PT does not imply that v 1 is different from other addresses occurring in PT . Similarly, we also combine the two formulas resulting from AL * and PT by "∧", as both express different properties of the same memory addresses.
Definition 5 (Representing States by SL Formulas
Reflecting two's complement representation, for any LLVM type ty, we define
where v 3 ∈ V sym is fresh. We assume a little-endian data layout (where the least significant byte is stored in the lowest address). 3 Here, we let v 1 → 0 v 3 SL = true and 2 We use " →" instead of " →" in separation logic, since mem | n 1 → n 2 would imply that mem(n) is undefined for all n = n 1 . This would be inconvenient in our formalization, since PT usually only contains information about a part of the allocated memory. 3 A corresponding representation could also be defined for big-endian layout. This layout information is necessary to decide which concrete states are represented by abstract states, but it is not used when constructing symbolic execution graphs (i.e., our remaining approach is independent of such layout information). 4 We identify sets of first-order formulas {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } with their conjunction ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n . Thus, CS is identified with the set resp. with the conjunction of the equations 1≤i≤n 
We 
From LLVM to Symbolic Execution Graphs
We now show how to automatically generate a symbolic execution graph that over-approximates all possible executions of a given program. For this, we present symbolic execution rules for some of the most important LLVM instructions. We start with the rules for the LLVM instructions in our strlen example in Sect. 3.1. In Sect. 3.2, we present rules for a more advanced example including memory allocation and function calls.
While there already exist approaches for symbolic execution of C or LLVM (e.g., in the tools KLEE [18] and Ufo [1] ), our new abstract domain is particularly suitable for tracking explicit information about memory allocations and the contents of memory, allowing a fully automated analysis of programs with direct memory access and pointer arithmetic. Most other existing tools cannot successfully analyze termination of such programs fully automatically without the specification of invariants by the user. In particular, we also have rules for refining and generalizing abstract states. This is needed to obtain finite symbolic execution graphs that represent all possible executions. We present our algorithm to generalize states in Sect. 3.3.
Basic Symbolic Execution Rules
Our analysis starts with the set of initial states that one wants to analyze for termination, e.g., all states where str points to a string. So in our example, we start with the abstract state ( †). Fig. 1 depicts the symbolic execution graph for strlen. Here, we omitted the component AL = { u str , v end } for the global allocation list, which stays the same in all states in this example. We also abbreviated parts of CS, KB, and PT by "…". Instead of v end → i8 z and z = 0, we directly wrote v end → 0, etc.
The function strlen starts with loading the character at address str to c0. Let p : ins denote that ins is the instruction at position p. Our first rule handles the case p :"x = load ty* ad", i.e., the value of type ty at the address ad is assigned to the variable x. In our rules, let a always denote the state before the execution step (i.e., above the horizontal line of the rule). Moreover, we write a instead of a FO . As each memory cell stores one byte,
Fig. 1 Symbolic execution graph for strlen
in the load-rule we first have to check whether the addresses ad, . . . , ad + size(ty) − 1 are allocated, i.e., whether there is a . Moreover, we add LV 1 (ad) → ty w to PT . Thus, if PT already contained a formula LV 1 (ad) → ty u, then a implies w = u. We used this rule to obtain B from A in Fig. 1 . In memory access instructions like load, one can also specify an optional alignment al which indicates that the respective addresses are divisible by al. This alignment information is generated by the LLVM code emitter (e.g., by the compiler from C to LLVM). It is a hint to the code generator (which transforms LLVM code into machine code) that the address will be at the specified alignment. The code generator may use this information for optimizations.
Note in the rules that LV 1 is a partial function, i.e., LV 1 may not be defined for all x ∈ V P . But according to [53] , in well-formed LLVM programs all uses of a variable are dominated by its definition. So LV 1 (x) is always defined when we read from x during symbolic execution.
load from allocated memory ( p : "x = load ty* ad [, align al]" with x, ad ∈ V P , al ∈ N)
In a similar way, we formulate a rule for instructions that store a value at some address in the memory. The instruction "store ty t, ty* ad" stores the value t of type ty at the address ad. Again, we check whether LV 1 (ad), . . . , LV 1 (ad) + size(ty) − 1 are addresses in an allocated part of the memory. The information that ad now points to t is added to the set PT . All other information in PT that is not influenced by this change is kept. 6 store to allocated memory ( p : "store ty t, ty* ad [, align al]", t ∈ V P ∪Z, ad ∈ V P , al ∈ N)
If load or store accesses a non-allocated address or if the address does not correspond to the specified alignment, then memory safety is violated and we reach the ERR state.
load or store on unallocated memory ( p : "x = load ty* ad [, align al]" with x, ad ∈ V P and al ∈ N, or p : "store ty t, ty* ad [, align al]" with t ∈ V P ∪Z, ad ∈ V P , and al ∈ N)
load or store with unsafe alignment ( p : "x = load ty* ad, align al" with x, ad ∈ V P and al ∈ N >0 , or p : "store ty t, ty* ad, align al" with t ∈ V P ∪Z, ad ∈ V P , and al ∈ N >0 )
The instructions icmp and br in strlen's entry block check if the first character c0 is 0. In that case, we have reached the end of the string and jump to the block done. Thus, we now introduce rules for integer comparison. For "x = icmp eq ty t 1 , t 2 ", we check if the state contains enough information to decide whether the values t 1 and t 2 of type ty are equal. In that case, the value 1 resp. 0 (i.e., true resp. false) is assigned to x. icmp eq ( p : "x = icmp eq ty t 1 , t 2 " with x ∈ V P and t 1 , t 2 ∈ V P ∪ Z)
Other integer comparisons (for <, ≤, …) are handled analogously. Note that LLVM always represents integers in two's complement, as does the knowledge base in our states. However, some instructions explicitly consider values in an unsigned way, and this needs to be reflected in our evaluation rules. As an example, suppose that | a ⇒ v = −2 7 ∧ w = 2 7 − 1. Then signed comparison yields v < w, but unsigned comparison yields v > w, because v is stored as (1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0), whereas w is stored as ( 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1). So for an unsigned comparison, we check whether the two values to be compared are either both positive or both negative, i.e., have the same sign. In this case, the comparison on the unsigned interpretation coincides with the signed comparison. For different signs, negative numbers (like v = −2 7 ) are always greater than positive ones (like w = 2 7 − 1). As an example, the following rule illustrates the affirmative case (w = 1) of unsigned less-or-equal (ule).
icmp ule ( p : "x = icmp ule ty t 1 , t 2 " with x ∈ V P and t 1 ,
The rules for icmp are only applicable if KB contains enough information to evaluate the respective condition. Otherwise, a case analysis needs to be performed, i.e., one has to refine the abstract state by extending its knowledge base. This is done by the following rule, which transforms an abstract state into two new ones. 7 refining abstract states ( p : "x = icmp eq ty t 1 ,
In state B of Fig. 1 , we evaluate "c0zero = icmp eq i8 c0, 0", i.e., we check if the first character c0 of the string str is 0. Since this cannot be inferred from B's knowledge base, we refine B to the successor states C and D and call the edges from B to C and D refinement edges. In D, we have c0 = v 1 and v 1 = 0. Thus, the icmp-rule yields E where c0zero = v 2 and v 2 = 0. We do not display the successors of C that lead to a program end.
The next instruction in our example is "br i1 c0zero, label done, label loop", a conditional jump (or branch) to another block. Let us first consider a similar, but simpler case. The instruction "br label b next " means that the execution has to continue with the first instruction in the block b next . When execution moves from one block to another, in the new target block one first evaluates the phi instructions that may be present at its beginning. These instructions are needed due to the static single assignment form of LLVM and initialize the variables in the target block depending on from which block we are entering the target block. Such phi instructions may only occur at the beginning of a block, i.e., every block starts with a (possibly empty) sequence of phi instructions. A phi instruction has the form "x = phi ty [t 1 ,b 1 ], . . . ,[t n ,b n ]", meaning that if the previous block was b j , then the value t j is assigned to x. All t 1 , . . . , t n must have type ty. A peculiarity of phi instructions is that all phi instructions in the same block are executed atomically together.
So all local variables occurring in t 1 , . . . , t n still have the values that they had before entering the new target block.
To handle phi in combination with the br instruction at the end of the previous block, we introduce an auxiliary function firstNonPhi. For any block b, firstNonPhi(b) is the index of the first non-phi instruction in b. Moreover, we define the function computePhi to implement the parallel execution of all phi statements "x 1 = phi ty 1 
at the start of the block b next . Its arguments are the current values LV of the local variables, the current block b j , and the target block b next , and it returns a pair (LV , KB phi ), where LV reflects the updated local variables and KB phi contains information on the new symbolic variables introduced in LV :
where w 1 , . . . , w m ∈ V sym are fresh. Now we can define a rule that allows us to perform an unconditional jump with br to a block b next and that executes b next 's phi instructions.
For conditional branches "br i1 t, label b 1 , label b 2 ", one has to check whether the current state contains enough information to conclude that t is 1 (i.e., true) or 0 (i.e., false). Then the evaluation continues after the phi instructions of block b 1 resp. b 2 .
conditional br ( p : "br i1 t, label b 1 , label b 2 " with t ∈ V P ∪ {0, 1} and b 1 
With the br instruction, one now jumps to the loop block in State F. Note that we simplified the equalities resulting from computePhi in F, to avoid renaming in the presentation.
The strlen function traverses the string using a pointer s, and the loop terminates when s eventually reaches the last memory cell of the string (containing 0). Then one jumps to done, converts the pointers s and str to integers, and returns their difference. To perform the required pointer arithmetic, "bd = getelementptr ty* ad,in t" increases ad by the size of t elements of type ty (i.e., by size(ty) · t) and assigns this address to bd. 8 getelementptr ( p : "bd = getelementptr ty* ad, in t", ad, bd ∈ V P , t ∈ V P ∪ Z)
In Fig. 1 , this rule is used for the step from F to G, which implies s = str + 1. In the step to H , the character at address s is loaded to c. To ensure memory safety, the load-rule checks that s is in an allocated part of the memory (i.e., that u str ≤ u str + 1 ≤ v end ). This holds because G implies u str ≤ v end and u str = v end (as u str → v 1 , v end → 0 ∈ PT , and v 1 = 0 ∈ KB). Finally, we check whether c is 0. We again perform a refinement which yields the states I and J . State J corresponds to the case c = 0 and thus, we obtain czero = 0 in K .
Finally, we present rules for the instructions ptrtoint and sub that are used in the block done of the strlen example. The ptrtoint instruction simply converts pointers to integers and is needed to perform subsequent arithmetic operations on them (e.g., to subtract one address from another in the strlen algorithm). In a similar way, we also have rules to handle other LLVM instructions for casting between pointers and different types of integers.
ptrtoint ( p : "x = ptrtoint ty* ad to in" with x, ad ∈ V P )
In sub instructions of the form "x = sub ty t 1 , t 2 ", both t 1 and t 2 must have the type ty and the variable x also gets this type. We use similar rules to handle other LLVM instructions for other arithmetic, Boolean, and bit manipulation operations.
Advanced Symbolic Execution Rules
Now we also present rules that allow allocation of memory, function calls, and manipulation of larger memory chunks. We start with a rule for the alloca statement. The instruction "x = alloca ty, in t" allocates memory for t elements of the type ty. Here, x is an identifier from V P of type ty* and t is either an identifier or a natural number. Thus, a new interval is allocated (i.e., the allocation list AL 1 of the current stack frame is extended by v 1 , v 2 for fresh symbolic variables v 1 , v 2 ) and KB is extended by
Moreover, the address of the first memory cell in the newly allocated block is assigned to x. Thus, we update LV 1 by x = v 1 . Again, the code emitter may have added an alignment al. In contrast to load and store, it is not designed as a hint for the code generator but as a requirement that the result of the allocation must be at least al-aligned. If no alignment is specified or al = 0, one uses the alignment align(ty) specified by the ABI (application binary interface) of the target machine and operating system. The code emitter writes information on the ABI alignment of pointers and the most common integer, vector, and floating point types in the header of the LLVM program. For all remaining types, the ABI alignment is computed from these given alignments. Allocating 0 bytes results in undefined behavior, which may therefore violate memory safety and affect the termination behavior. alloca ( p : "x = alloca ty, in t [, align al]" with x ∈ V P , t ∈ V P ∪ Z, and al ∈ N)
, where c = al, if al ≥ 1 is specified, or else c = align(ty),
Note that alloca is used to allocate memory on the stack, whereas malloc and free allocate and release memory on the heap. The latest versions of LLVM do not have builtin malloc or free instructions anymore, but one has to call them as external functions (provided by the standard C library). For LLVM programs that call malloc or free, we use the following two inference rules. The rule for malloc mainly differs from the rule for alloca by placing the newly allocated memory region into the global allocation list instead of the allocation list of the current stack frame. Here, "x = call i8* @malloc(in t)" allocates t bytes and the address of the first memory cell in this block is assigned to x. Depending on the processor architecture of the target machine, the allocated memory is 8-byte or 16-byte aligned. Our rule for malloc currently does not take into account that malloc may also return NULL without allocating any memory. However, we could easily support this by introducing a corresponding second successor state for this possible outcome. malloc ( p : "x = call i8* @malloc(in t)" with x ∈ V P and t ∈ V P ∪ Z)
• KB = KB ∪ {v 1 mod c = 0}, where c = 8 for 32-bit platforms and c = 16 for 64-bit platforms,
LLVM does not explicitly distinguish between the heap and stack, but applies the same memory model for both (using load and store). However, memory acquired by alloca is automatically released at the end of the function in which it was allocated, while memory acquired by malloc has to be released explicitly by calling free. The instruction "call void @free(i8* t)" releases the allocated memory block starting at the address t. Moreover, it deletes those entries from PT which are known to correspond to this memory block. Calling free on NULL does not change the state. If free is called with an address that is neither the beginning of an allocated memory block in the global allocation list (of memory allocated by malloc) nor NULL, then memory safety is violated and we reach the state ERR.
free ( p : "call void @free(i8* t)" with t ∈ V P ∪ Z)
To illustrate the rules for allocating and releasing memory, assume that we call the function strlen within a main function with a pointer to a memory area allocated by malloc. The symbolic execution graph for the corresponding LLVM program is depicted in Fig.  2 . The first instruction is icmp slt, which checks if the function argument i in signed interpretation is less than 1 (slt). Since in state A , we do not have any information on i, we refine A to the states B and C . C is then evaluated to D , where the result of the comparison is assigned to ineg. Depending on the value of ineg, the select instruction assigns 1 or i to the variable bytes. In F , the call of malloc has been evaluated: the entry v ad , v ad end is added to the global allocation list and in the knowledge base we keep the relationship between the start address v ad and the end address v ad end . In M , the allocated memory area is released again, leading to an empty global allocation list and an empty list PT at the end of the program. The transition from I to J corresponds to a call of the function strlen and the transition from K to L corresponds to a return from this function. The symbolic execution rules for the select instruction are analogous to the rules for icmp. The instructions call and ret for calling and returning from a function are needed when going beyond intraprocedural analysis. The rule for call pushes a new frame on the call stack whose position is the entry point of the called function and the argument values are assigned to its parameters. When the ret instruction is encountered, the top frame is popped from the stack again. For reasons of space, we only present the rules for non-void functions.
call ( p : "x = call ty @function(ty 1 t 1 , …, ty n t n )" with x ∈ V P , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ V P ∪ Z)
• function.entry is the entry block of function • function is declared as function (ty 1 u 1 , . . . , ty n u n ), 
• PT results from PT by removing all v → ty w where there exists some
Generalizing Abstract States
In the strlen example and its graph in Fig. 1 , after reaching K , one unfolds the loop once more until one reaches a state K at position (loop, 4) again, analogous to the first iteration. To obtain finite symbolic execution graphs, we generalize our states whenever an evaluation visits a program position (b, j) twice and the domains of the local variable mappings LV i in the two states are the same. Thus, we have to find a state that is more general than
For readability, we again write " →" instead of " → i8 ". Then p = (loop, 4), AL = { u str , v end }, and
Our aim is to construct a new state L that is more general than K and K , but contains enough information for the remaining proof. We now present our heuristic for merging states that is used in our implementation.
To merge K and K , we keep those constraints of K that also hold in K . To this end, we proceed in two steps. First, we create a new state
L ) using fresh symbolic variables v x for all x ∈ V P where LV K 1 and LV K 1 are defined. This yields 3 . By injectivity of LV K 1 , we can also define a pseudo-inverse of μ K that maps K 's variables to L by setting μ
is analogous). So symbolic variables in K and K corresponding to the same program variable are mapped to the same symbolic variable by μ
In a second step, we use the mappings μ −1
Here, v 1 is not changed by μ
because it is not assigned to a program variable. It remains to construct KB L . Essentially, we would like to take the intersection of those formulas that are implied by the knowledge bases of K and K . So in principle, we would like to define the knowledge base of the new merged state L as follows:
However, with this definition KB L would be an infinite set of formulas, which is not suitable for automation. Thus, we restrict the definition of KB L to a finite subset of (1) that can be automatically generated from the knowledge bases of the states K and K . This restriction is only a heuristic and has no impact on the correctness, since it would already be correct to include all formulas of (1) in the knowledge base of the generalized state. Our heuristic for the restriction of (1) considers K 's knowledge base and extends it by certain additional formulas. This leads to a finite set K . For these finitely many formulas we then check whether they are also implied by K (when renaming variables appropriately).
More precisely, we have v 3 = u str ("olds = str") in K , but v 3 = v 4 , v 4 = v 3 + 1, v 3 = u str ("olds = str + 1") in K . To keep as much information as possible, we rewrite equations to inequations before performing the generalization. So let K result from extending K by t 1 ≥ t 2 and t 1 ≤ t 2 for any equation t 1 = t 2 ∈ K . In our example, we obtain v 3 ≥ u str ∈ K ("olds ≥ str"). Moreover, for any t 1 = t 2 ∈ K , we check whether K implies t 1 > t 2 or t 1 < t 2 , and add the respective inequation to K . In this way, one can express sequences of inequations t 1 = t 2 , t 1 +1 = t 2 , . . . , t 1 +n = t 2 (where t 1 ≤ t 2 ) by a single inequation t 1 +n < t 2 , which is needed for suitable generalizations afterwards. We use this to derive v 4 
We then let KB L consist of all formulas ϕ from K that are also implied by K , again translating variable names using μ −1
. Thus, we have
In Fig. 1 , we do not show the second loop unfolding from K to K , and directly draw a generalization edge with a dashed arrow from K to L. Such an edge expresses that all concrete states represented by K are also represented by the more general state L. Semantically, a state a is a generalization of a state a iff | a SL ⇒ μ( a SL ) for some instantiation μ.
In the strlen example, we continue symbolic execution in state L. Similar to the execution from F to K , after 5 steps another state N at position (loop, 4) is reached. In Fig. 1 , the dotted arrows from L to M and from M to N abbreviate several evaluation steps. As L is again a generalization of N using an instantiation μ with μ(v c ) = w c , μ(v s ) = w s , and μ(v olds ) = w olds , we draw a generalization edge from N to L. The construction of a symbolic execution graph is finished as soon as all leaves have only one stack frame, which is at a ret instruction. We call a non-empty symbolic execution graph with this property complete. In particular, a complete symbolic execution graph cannot contain an ERR state.
The approach presented so far is sufficient to prove memory safety (and together with the techniques in Sect. 5 also termination) of the strlen function, cf. Sect. 4 and 5. Up to now, when merging states we make relations between symbolic variables explicit (by adding inequations between symbolic variables). Then, these inequations are retained in the merged state if they are present in both states to be merged. In other words, these inequations restrict the state space of the represented concrete states and we want to keep as many restrictions as possible during merging in order to obtain a more precise abstraction. In some cases, however, it is also important to make relations between differences of symbolic variables explicit (e.g., about the distance between addresses). So in addition to inequations like v 1 ≥ v 2 or v 1 > v 2 in K , we may also add equations like v 1 − v 2 = w 1 − w 2 for symbolic variables v 1 , v 2 , w 1 , w 2 . By making these equations explicit, they can also be retained when merging states.
So far, relations established and preserved by instructions within a "loop" (i.e., a path through the program leading from some program position back to the same position) are usually retained by our merging heuristic. For example, the instruction s = getelementptr i8* olds, i32 1 within the block loop leads to the relation v 4 = v 3 + 1 in K and to the relation v 4 = v 3 + 1 in K , where v 4 and v 4 correspond to the program variable s and v 3 and v 3 correspond to the program variable olds. Thus, the relation v s = v olds + 1 is also contained in the merged state L for the corresponding "merged" symbolic variables v s and v olds .
However, relations established before a loop may be generalized or removed during merging. As example, the instruction olds = phi i8* [str,entry], [s,loop] assigns the value of str to the variable olds when the block loop is entered for the first time. So in the state K , we had the relation v 3 = u str where the symbolic variables v 3 and u str correspond to the program variables olds and str. Since in K , the value of olds has been increased by 1, this is generalized to the inequation v olds ≥ v str in the merged Fig. 3 The strcpy function and a graphical illustration of its symbolic execution state L. So by merging states, we lose the information on the exact distance between olds and its initial value str.
Of course, we need to abstract to obtain a finite representation of all evaluations. However, we might want to keep the knowledge that two distances between different symbolic variables are the same. This knowledge is necessary for a successful analysis of the strcpy function below (cf. [62, 72] ). This function copies the string at the source address s2 to the destination address s1. The while loop of the function terminates as soon as the value 0 is reached in the source string. char* strcpy(char* s1, char* s2) { char* dst = s1; char* src = s2; while ((*dst++ = *src++) != '\0'); return s1; }
To ease readability, we do not depict the full symbolic execution graph. Instead, Fig. 3 shows a graphical illustration of some key program states in the execution of strcpy. The initial state I describes states in which the destination s1 begins an allocated memory block whose length is at least as long as the source string s2. Moreover, the symbolic variables u 1 and u 2 refer to the last address in each allocated memory block. State A corresponds to the first entry into the loop, in which the program variables dst and src point to the same addresses as s1 and s2, respectively. After one loop iteration, both src and dst have been incremented by one, as shown in B . For the states A and B , the merging approach presented so far would generate a state requiring only s1 ≤ dst ≤ u 1 and s2 ≤ src ≤ u 2 , but it would not keep any information about the exact distances of dst from s1 and of src from s2. However, this is not sufficient to prove memory safety (and hence termination) of the strcpy function, as this generalized state would also represent cases in which the destination memory area starting at dst is shorter than the source area. To handle such examples successfully, our merging heuristic needs to relate the difference between dst and s1 with the difference between src and s2, obtaining a state such as C .
So when merging two states a and b, we also check whether there are symbolic variables
To simplify the search, we only consider cases where v a 3 − v a 4 = k 2 for some constant k 2 , and to avoid several equivalent equations due to symmetries, we require that k 1 > 0 and k 2 ≥ 0. If the corresponding relation 
is defined, and we let μ a and μ b be the identity on all remaining variables from V sym .
•
Note that a may contain arbitrary formulas from QF_IA(V sym ) since a ⊆ a . Moreover, the terms t 1 , t 2 in a \ a are arbitrary (possibly non-linear) arithmetic terms. So our definition for a is beyond those classes of formulas that are typically used in abstract interpretation (i.e., beyond octagons [57] and even polyhedra [29] ). This is crucial for the success of our approach, since the conditions of programs often contain formulas that are not in these restricted classes. Indeed, our definition of a was very successful in our implementation.
We now define a rule to compute generalization edges automatically. Recall that semantically, a state a is a generalization of a state a iff | a SL ⇒ μ( a SL ) for some instantiation μ. To automate our procedure, we define a weaker relationship between a and a . We say that a = (CS , KB , AL , PT ) is a generalization of a = (CS, KB, AL, PT ) with the instantiation μ whenever the conditions (b)-(f) of the following rule are satisfied. Again, let a denote the state before the generalization step (i.e., above the horizontal line of the rule) and let a be the state resulting from the generalization (i.e., below the line). 
The above rule does not refer to the merging of states in Definition 7, but it introduces a general form of "generalizations". The correctness of this rule is obvious, as it clearly implies | a SL ⇒ μ( a SL ). Condition (a) is needed to avoid cycles of refinement and generalization steps in the symbolic execution graph, which would not correspond to any computation.
Of course, many approaches are possible to compute such generalizations. Theorem 8 shows that the merging heuristic from Definition 7 satisfies the conditions of the generalization rule. So if a state c results from merging a and b, then c is indeed a generalization of both a and b. Theorem 8 also shows that if one uses the merging heuristic for generalizations, then the construction of symbolic execution graphs always terminates when applying the following strategy:
(1) If b is the next state to evaluate symbolically and there is a path from some state a to b, where a and b are at the same program position, the domains of all functions LV in a are equal to the domains of the corresponding functions LV in b, b has an incoming evaluation edge, and a has no incoming refinement edge, then:
(1a) If a is a generalization of b (i.e., the corresponding conditions of the generalization rule are satisfied), then we draw a generalization edge from b to a. Here, any SMT solver can be used to prove Condition (c) of the "generalization" rule. (1b) Otherwise, remove a's children, and add a generalization edge from a to the merging c of a and b. If a already had an incoming generalization edge from some state q, then remove a and add a generalization edge from q to c instead.
(2) Otherwise, just evaluate b symbolically as usual, applying refinements when needed.
Theorem 8 (Soundness and Termination of Merging) Let c result from merging the states a and b as in Definition 7. Then c is a generalization of a and b with the instantiations μ a and μ b , respectively. Moreover, if a is not already a generalization of b, and n is the height of the call stacks in a, b, and c, then
Here, for any conjunction ϕ, let |ϕ| denote the number of its conjuncts. Thus, the above strategy to construct symbolic execution graphs always terminates.
Proof To show that c is a generalization of a and b with the instantiations μ a and μ b , we have to prove that the conditions (b)-(f) of the generalization rule are satisfied. By definition,
Condition (e) on AL c i and condition (f) on PT c can be proved in a similar way.
It remains to prove (c).
Finally, we show that | c |+(
We first show that c = c . The reason is that whenever there is a t 1 = t 2 ∈ c , then
Hence, we also obtain t 1 > t 2 ∈ c . The case where t 1 = t 2 ∈ c and | c ⇒ t 1 < t 2 is analogous. Finally, consider the case that
Next note that c = KB c . Again the reason is that for any ϕ ∈ c we have 
which shows condition (d). Conditions (e) and (f) follow from |AL
c i | = |AL a i | resp. |PT c | = |PT a | for similar reasons. Finally, |KB c | = | a | means that for all ϕ ∈ μ −1 a ( a ), we have | μ −1 b ( b ) ⇒ ϕ. Let ψ ∈ μ b (μ −1 a (KB a )). Then we have μ −1 b (ψ) ∈ μ −1 a (KB a ) ⊆ μ −1 a ( a ). Hence, we can infer | μ −1 b ( b ) ⇒ μ −1 b (ψ) which implies | b ⇒ ψ, cf. Condition (c).
Correctness of Symbolic Execution
We now prove the correctness of our approach in Sects. 2 and 3, i.e., that our symbolic execution graphs represent an over-approximation of all concrete program runs. We proceed in two stages, as depicted graphically in Fig. 4 . This proof structure is inspired by the correctness proof of our termination technique for Java w.r.t. a suitable formal semantics [11] . First, we relate the formal definition of the LLVM semantics from the Vellvm project [73] to our semantics → LLVM of LLVM from Sects. 2 and 3 that we use for program analysis. Here, → LLVM is defined by applying our symbolic execution rules of Sect. 3 to concrete states. Only for rules that deal with memory access (via load, store, alloca, or malloc), our symbolic execution rules have to be adapted slightly. This is necessary since the concrete rules essentially have to implement an LLVM interpreter. For example, in a concrete state we Fig. 4 Relation between evaluation in LLVM and paths in the symbolic execution graph know the size of an allocated memory block in AL * (say, n bytes). Thus, the concrete rules put n entries for this block into PT to track the contents of all currently allocated memory. In our abstract rules, the size of an allocated memory block may be unknown, and thus, we do not know how many → ty -entries to add to PT . Hence, we can only represent a part of the memory contents in PT . Similarly, our symbolic execution can abstract information when a store operation partially overwrites a multi-byte value. However, for the concrete semantics → LLVM , we need to keep track of each allocated byte of memory. See [3] for the four cases where our rules for the abstract semantics need to be adapted for the concrete semantics.
Vellvm is a formalization of LLVM in the Coq [7] theorem prover. In this subsection, we only regard programs over the fragment supported by our rules. While Vellvm's nondeterministic semantics LLVM N D returns undef (which we currently do not support) for a load from uninitialized allocated memory, its deterministic semantics LLVM D returns the value 0. Thus, we use the semantics LLVM D and denote its transition relation by → Vellvm .
For our proof, we define a relation trans between Vellvm states and concrete states in our representation. Theorem 9 will state that for every evaluation step v 1 → Vellvm v 2 with trans( v 1 , c 1 ) , there is a c 2 with trans(v 2 , c 2 ) such that c 1 → LLVM c 2 holds. Moreover, if Vellvm's execution gets stuck in a state v (i.e., if the next instruction to execute would violate memory safety, denoted Stuck(v)) and trans(v, c), then we have c → LLVM ERR. So the idea is that we can "replay" any Vellvm execution as an execution on our concrete states. In a second step, we relate symbolic execution on abstract states to evaluation on concrete states. Theorem 10 states that if some concrete state c 1 is represented by a state a 1 in a symbolic execution graph (denoted by "repr" in Fig. 4 ) and c 1 → LLVM c 2 , then the graph contains a path from a 1 to a state a 2 in the symbolic execution graph such that a 2 represents c 2 .
Together, Theorems 9 and 10 show that symbolic execution graphs simulate Vellvm execution, and hence, they imply the soundness of our technique for analyzing memory safety w.r.t. the Vellvm semantics of LLVM: Suppose that there is an LLVM-computation Theorem 9 and 10 can also be used as a basis for the certification of termination proofs for LLVM. Several certifiers were developed to check the soundness of automatically generated termination proofs for term rewrite systems [8, 25, 69] . The correctness of these certifiers has been formally proved using Coq [7] or Isabelle/HOL [60] . To certify termination proofs for LLVM, one could build upon Vellvm by formalizing and proving the soundness of our symbolic execution (Theorems 9 and 10) within Coq or Isabelle. 10 Building on that, one could then formalize our approach to generate integer transition systems from the symbolic execution graph (Theorem 13 in Sect. 5) and one would also have to formalize the techniques used to prove termination of these ITSs. Steps in this direction are currently investigated within the certifier CeTA [69] , which can already be directly coupled with AProVE [38, Sect. 3] .
Vellvm's representation of (concrete) program states is similar to our Definition 3. The main difference is that Vellvm does not use symbolic variables since its program states are not designed for symbolic execution. This was also our main reason for developing a new representation for program states. We now express Vellvm's representation in our terminology.
Vellvm States A Vellvm state has the form (M, − → Σ ) for a memory state M and a list of stack frames − → Σ which is analogous to our call stack CS. In a stack frame Σ = (fid, b, − → c , tmn, Δ, α) , fid is the id of the current function, b is the label of the current basic block, − → c are the remaining instructions to be executed in the current block, with tmn as the terminator of the block (its last command). Together, these components correspond to our position p = (b, j) in the program where the command sequence " − → c , tmn" begins in block b at line j. Recall that we assume block labels to be different across different functions. Thus, we do not need to represent fid explicitly in our states. The component Δ keeps track of the values of the local variables of the block and corresponds to our functions LV i . The final component α (roughly) corresponds to our lists AL i and keeps track of the memory blocks allocated by the current stack frame that are released automatically when the current function returns.
Vellvm does not use absolute memory addresses, but pairs of a memory-block identifier (a number which is increased in each allocation) and an offset in that block. We say that a block identifier is valid if the corresponding memory block has been allocated and not yet released. In a Vellvm memory state M = (N , B, C) , N denotes the number of the next fresh memory block to allocate, B is a partial map from valid block identifiers to the size of the blocks (like our entries v 1 , v 2 ∈ AL * with size v 2 − v 1 + 1), and C is a partial map from pairs of a valid block identifier and an offset in that block to values (similar to our PT ).
Vellvm represents values in three ways. For integers, mb(sz, byte) represents the memory content byte and the bit-width sz of the overall integer (but not the position in the integer that this byte corresponds to). We represent similar information in PT . For uninitialized memory cells, the pseudo-value muninit is used, which stands for the value 0 in the semantics LLVM D . For pointers, Vellvm uses mptr(blk, ofs, idx), where the block blk and offset ofs characterize the pointer's target, and the index idx indicates which of the bytes of the pointer is represented.
Translation trans We now define a translation relation trans between Vellvm states and concrete states. The reason why trans is a relation instead of a function is that in contrast to us, Vellvm represents blocks of memory by their size and an identifier number but without absolute addresses. So for a Vellvm state v, we want to describe all concrete states (cf. 
Evaluation Rules
We now show that our evaluation → LLVM simulates → Vellvm . For reasons of space, we only demonstrate this for one Vellvm evaluation rule from [73] , adapted to our notation. In the following rule for br, eval(Δ, t) evaluates t according to Δ. br_true (tmn : "br i1 t, label b 1 , label b 2 " with t ∈ V P ∪ {0, 1} and
Theorem 9 shows that our evaluation rules on concrete states correspond to evaluation w.r.t. Vellvm. As mentioned, here we only consider the LLVM fragment handled by our rules and in addition, we assume that a load operation for a type in with n mod 8 = 0 is only performed for values that were written by a store of type in. Similarly, we assume that values written by a store operation for a type in with n mod 8 = 0 will only be read by a load of the same type. The reason is that for simplicity, our concrete states do not keep track of the type with which a store operation was performed. Therefore, we cannot distinguish whether a later load of, e.g., an i20 value should yield the contents of the memory cell or an unknown value. Our abstract domain over-estimates such incompatible reads by an unknown value. ERR. By Theorem 10, c → LLVM ERR implies that there is an edge from a to ERR in G. However, this contradicts the prerequisite that G is complete and therefore does not contain ERR.
From Symbolic Execution Graphs to Integer Transition Systems
Finally, we extract an integer transition system from the symbolic execution graph and use existing tools to prove its termination. The extraction step essentially restricts the information in abstract states to the integer constraints on symbolic variables. This conversion of memorybased arguments into integer arguments often suffices for the termination proof. The reason for considering only V sym instead of V P is that since the mappings LV i are injective, the variables V P are completely represented by symbolic variables and the conditions in the abstract states (which are crucial for termination) only concern symbolic variables.
For example, termination of strlen is proved by showing that s is increased as long as it is smaller than v end , the end of the input string. In Fig. 1 
An ITS I is terminating iff → I is well founded. 11 We convert symbolic execution graphs to ITSs by transforming every edge into a transition. If there is a generalization edge from a to a with an instantiation μ, then the new value of any v ∈ V sym (a) in a is μ(v). Hence, we create the transition (a, a ∪ {v = μ(v) | v ∈ V sym (a)}, a). 12 So for the edge from N to L in Fig. 1 , we obtain the condition {w s = w olds + 1,
An evaluation or refinement edge from a to a does not change the variables of V sym (a). Thus, we construct the transition (a,
So in the ITS resulting from Fig. 1 , the condition of the transition from A to B is {v end = v end , u str = u str }. The condition for the transition from B to D is the same, but extended by v 1 = v 1 . Hence, in the transition from A to B, the value of v 1 can change arbitrarily (since
, but in the transition from B to D, it must remain the same.
Definition 12 (ITS from Symbolic Execution Graph)
For a symbolic execution graph G, the corresponding integer transition system I G has one transition for each edge in G:
• If the edge from a to a is not a generalization edge, then I G has a transition from a to a with the condition a ∪ {v = v | v ∈ V sym (a)}.
• If there is a generalization edge from a to a with the instantiation μ, then I G has a transition from a to a with the condition
From the non-generalization edges on the path from L to N in Fig. 1 trans(v 1 , c 1 ) that is represented by a 1 ) , then Theorems 9 and 10 imply that there is a corresponding infinite path in the graph starting with the node a 1 . We now show that then the ITS resulting from the graph is not terminating. 
(c) Let a have a generalization edge to a with instantiation μ and an evaluation edge from a to a with 
As there is a generalization edge from a to a with the instantiation μ, we know that 
Limitations, Related Work, Experiments, and Conclusion
We have developed a new approach to prove memory safety and termination of C (resp. LLVM) programs with explicit pointer arithmetic and memory access. It relies on a representation of abstract program states which allows an easy automation of the rules for symbolic execution (by using standard SMT solving to check the first-order conditions of these rules). Moreover, this representation is suitable for generalizing abstract states and for generating integer transition systems. In this way, LLVM programs are translated fully automatically into ITSs amenable to automated termination analysis.
Limitations and Future Work
To simplify the formalization of our approach, we have not discussed global variables, which our implementation supports. In line with most other techniques, we currently do not handle the case that calls to malloc may fail, and we also assume that reading from uninitialized (but allocated) heap locations is safe and yields an arbitrary value. Our method could easily be adapted to lift these limitations. Furthermore, in this paper we disregard integer overflows and treat all integer types except i1 as the infinite set Z. An extension of our approach to bounded integers can be found in [44] .
In the paper, we only gave rules for a subset of all LLVM instructions. Our implementation handles several more instructions, but there exist instructions (or cases of instructions) where our implementation does not yet contain suitable rules for symbolic execution. In particular, our abstract domain currently does not handle undef values, floating point values, or vectors, and consequently, all corresponding instructions are unsupported. 13 When encountering an instruction that cannot be handled, the symbolic execution can still continue by removing all potentially affected knowledge. The same holds if one cannot prove all conditions of a symbolic execution rule. It often suffices to remove all information about the value that is computed by the instruction, e.g., for floating point operations.
In this paper, we did not treat recursive programs and we also did not present any method to prove that an LLVM program is not memory safe or does not terminate. However, we are working on extending our approach accordingly and our implementation already contains some support for recursion and non-termination by adapting our approaches for recursion and non-termination of Java programs [12, 13] . Another direction for further work could be to embed our analysis into a Counter-Example-Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) loop [24] to disprove termination or memory safety, and to automatically refine the abstraction.
Finally, we cannot yet analyze C programs using inductive data structures defined via "struct". However, in the future, we want to adapt our corresponding technique for termination analysis of Java programs [11, 12, 14, 63] . Instead of ITSs, here one generates integer term rewrite systems [35, 37] from the symbolic execution graph, where data objects are transformed into terms to represent them in a precise way.
Moreover, we would like to improve the scalability of our approach by a compositional treatment of LLVM functions. There are several tools based on separation logic which support local modular reasoning for shape analysis and the verification of memory safety, e.g., [19] [20] [21] . Moreover, compositional approaches for termination analysis were developed in [22, 28, 70] , based on [65] . Combining such approaches with the byte-precise handling of explicit low-level pointer arithmetic for termination analysis will be the subject of further work.
Related Work and Experimental Evaluation
There exist numerous other methods and tools for termination analysis of imperative programs (e.g., 2LS [22] , ARMC [64] , ARTMC [41, 45] [43] , …). Until very recently, most other approaches did not handle the heap at all, or supported dynamic data structures by an abstraction to integers (e.g., to represent sizes or lengths) or to terms (representing finite unravelings). In particular, most tools failed when the control flow depends on explicit pointer arithmetic and on detailed information about the contents of addresses. While our approach was inspired by our previous work on termination of Java, in the current paper we extend these techniques to prove termination and memory safety of programs with explicit pointer arithmetic. This requires a fundamentally new approach, as pointer arithmetic cannot be expressed in the Java-based techniques of [11, 12, 14, 63] .
We implemented our technique in the termination prover AProVE [38, 68] , which uses the SMT solvers Yices [34] and Z3 [31] in the back-end. AProVE participated very successfully in the International Competition on Software Verification (SV-COMP) 14 at TACAS and in the International Termination Competition (TermComp), 15 both of which feature categories for termination of C programs since 2014.
To evaluate AProVE empirically, we compare its performance with other tools on all 631 programs from the Termination category of SV-COMP 2016. For termination of low-level C programs, one also has to ensure their memory safety. Approaches for proving memory safety of programs with pointer arithmetic were proposed in [19, 40] , for example. However, while there exist several tools to prove memory safety of C programs, many of them do not handle explicit byte-accurate pointer arithmetic (e.g., Thor [55, 56] or SLAyer [6] ) or require the user to provide the needed loop invariants (as in the Jessie plug-in of Frama-C [58] ). In contrast, our approach can prove memory safety of such algorithms automatically. More precisely, for the 631 programs in our collection, AProVE shows memory safety for 547 examples. In contrast, the most powerful tool for verifying memory safety at SV-COMP 2016 (Predator [33] ) proves memory safety for 431 examples (see [3] for details). However, this comparison is not very meaningful, since Predator considers bounded integers, whereas AProVE assumes integers to be unbounded. Thus, the resulting notions of memory safety are incomparable. Moreover, there exist several tools to disprove memory safety (e.g., Predator, CPAchecker [54] , and LLBMC [36] ). In contrast, AProVE can only prove, but not disprove memory safety, since our symbolic execution graph over-approximates all possible program runs. So the occurrence of ERR in our graph does not imply that the program is really unsafe.
To evaluate the power of our approach for proving termination, we compared AProVE to the most powerful other tools (Ultimate and SeaHorn) from the Termination category of SV-COMP 2016, and to HipTNT+. (AProVE, Ultimate, and HipTNT+ were the most powerful tools in the C category of TermComp 2015 and in the Termination category of SV-COMP 2015.) In addition, we included the tool KITTeL in our evaluation, which operates on LLVM as well. Recall that in the present paper, we only introduced techniques to prove (but not to disprove) termination of programs. Therefore, to evaluate the contributions of the present paper, we excluded those C programs from our evaluation that are known to be non-terminating. This resulted in 498 programs. 16 Above, we show the performance of the tools for a time limit of 900 s per example. For AProVE, Ultimate, and SeaHorn, we used the results of SV-COMP 2016. The other tools were run on an Intel Xeon with 4 cores clocked at 2.33 GHz each and 16 GB of RAM. "YES" gives the number of examples where termination could be proved, "MAYBE" states how often the tool could not find a proof within 900 s, and "Runtime" is the average time in seconds for those examples where the tool proved termination. The table shows that in these experiments, AProVE is the most powerful tool for proving termination of C programs. On the other hand, since AProVE constructs symbolic execution graphs to prove memory safety and to infer suitable invariants needed for termination proofs, its runtime is often higher. For details on the experiments and to access our implementation in AProVE via a web interface, we refer to [3] .
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